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The long running debate among economic historians over how long it took regional financial markets
in the United States to become fully integrated should be of considerable interest to students of
monetary unions. This paper reviews the debate, discusses the implications of various hypotheses
for the optimality of the US monetary union, and presents some new findings on the origin and
diffusion of monetary shocks. It appears that financial markets were integrated in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries in the sense that monetary shocks were routinely transmitted from one
part of the United States to another. In particular, shocks to interest rates in the eastern financial
centers were routinely transmitted to the periphery. However, it also appears that during this period
significant shocks to bank lending rates in the periphery often arose on the periphery itself. This
suggests that a nineteenth century monetary authority that relied on operations confined to eastern
financial centers would have had a difficult time managing the U.S. monetary union. After World























1. Financial Integration in a Monetary Union 
 
  There has been a long-running debate among economic historians over how 
quickly financial markets in the United States achieved integration after the formation of 
a currency union in 1788.  Some students of American capital markets believe that full 
integration was not achieved until more than a century later.  Today, the inclusion of 
additional countries in the EMU, the dollarization of countries in Latin America, and the 
creation of wholly new monetary unions are real possibilities. Therefore, this debate over 
the speed at which the U.S. capital market integrated is worth reviewing for the light that 
it sheds on the potential development of the capital market as an efficient transmission 
system for monetary policy within a monetary union. 
This debate can be traced to Lance Davis's (1965) classic paper, although one 
could also cite the older paper by R.M. Breckenridge (1898), which is still well worth 
reading. More recent contributions, just to mention a few of our favorites, include 
Richard Sylla (1967, 1969), John James (November 1976, December 1976), Gene Smiley 
(1975), Richard Keehn (1980), and (of course!) Howard Bodenhorn and Hugh Rockoff 
(1992).  
The focus of this literature has been on why there were persistent regional 
differences in interest rates, and on how long these differences took to disappear. One 
reason for focusing on long-run differences is the concern of economic historians with 





capital from one region to another, and the movement of capital from the Northeast to the 
West, Midwest, and South, was a major source of economic growth.  
A second reason for focusing on long-run differences in rates is a concern with 
the efficiency of markets. One might be tempted to assume that financial markets, 
especially short-term markets, would integrate soon after a monetary union was formed. 
Labor markets, real capital markets, or final goods markets might show less uniformity of 
response because of legal or cultural barriers to trade. However, one would think that one 
could depend on the integration of financial markets to create an effective transmission 
mechanism for monetary policy. For one thing people who work in financial markets are 
knowledgeable specialists in arbitrage: we would expect them to respond quickly to small 
profit opportunities. Moreover, the physical cost of transporting money from one place to 
another is trivial compared with the costs of moving labor or real capital. We might 
expect workers to respond slowly to a difference in real wages, and we might expect it to 
take time to build new factories and move machinery; but we would expect financiers to 
respond quickly to a difference in interest rates. In other words, the suggestion that 
persistent regional differences might be an example of market failure undoubtedly 
motivated much of the research in this area. 
This literature, whatever the original motives, provides useful information for 
students of monetary unions. If changes in interest rates in eastern financial markets were 
transmitted in a slow and halting way to the periphery, or simply were not transmitted at 
all, then there was little potential for an effective monetary union, at least one managed 
through short-term rates.





States the whole of the nineteenth century to achieve an integrated financial market 
would make the United States a pessimistic model for monetary unions.  
Efficient transmission of shocks from one part of the monetary union to another is 
merely a necessary condition for an optimal currency area. The key question, as pointed 
out long ago by Robert Mundell, is whether business cycles (here assumed to be reflected 
in interest-rate cycles) in different regions were synchronous. Did shocks to interest rates 
occur nationwide or were some regions subject to important independent shocks?  If 
interest rate shocks are system wide, a monetary union can be managed in a simple way. 
The monetary authority can offset system wide shocks by taking actions in the central 
money market. On the other hand, if independent shocks occur frequetly in outlying parts 
of the monetary union, the problem facing the monetary authority becomes far more 
complicated. Suppose an undesirable rate increase occurs in the periphery while rates 
remain at target levels in the core. What is a monetary authority to do? If rates in the core 
are lowered in order to combat high rates on the periphery, rates in the core will be too 
low. The first case, of course, corresponds to the case in which the monetary union is an 
optimal currency area in Mundell’s sense; the second case, one in which it was not. 
We will begin by exploring the existing literature for the information it contains 
about the pace of financial integration.  
 
2. The Debate over Financial Market Integration 
The analogy that most students of U.S. financial markets have had in mind is with 
a market for some uniform commodity, for example wheat. In the absence of 





particular grade of wheat to be the same everywhere. A shock to the system, moreover, 
would be transmitted quickly to all parts of the market. A bad harvest in the Ukraine 
would produce a general increase in the price of wheat throughout the world. In the same 
way, we might expect interest rates to be the same in the absence of transactions costs, 
usury laws, and so on. If there were barriers to trade, then we would see higher or lower 
prices persisting in some markets. Technological progress or institutional change that 
reduced barriers to trade would produce a more uniform price.  
Breckenridge (1898) may have been the first to look at U.S. short-term capital 
markets with this analogy in mind. He looked at rates on commercial paper in different 
cities of the United States in the 1890s, and found differences in rates that he considered 
astonishing. While the average rate in Boston for 1893-97 was 3.832 percent, the average 
rate in Omaha Nebraska was 7.980 percent, Breckenridge (1898, 120). Breckenridge 
rejected the possibility that differences in the risk of repayment could explain the 
differences in rates. The commercial paper on which Breckenridge focused most of his 
attention consisted of short-term, first-class double name paper.
3  He regarded this sort of 
paper as carrying a very low risk of default in every part of the country.
4 If risk couldn't 
explain the regional differences what did? Based on comparisons with Canada, and other 
developed countries, Breckenridge concluded that the fragmented structure of the 
American banking system set up artificial barriers to the movement of capital. A few 
large banks with headquarters in Toronto and Montreal and branches throughout the 
country dominated the Canadian system. The U.S. system, on the other hand, consisted of 






The modern literature, as we noted above, begins with Davis (1965). One of 
Davis's innovations was to make use of the reports of the Comptroller of the Currency on 
the National Banks. This source provides the income and expenditure data and balance 
sheets for all of the National Banks of the United States. From it Davis was able to 
compute proxies for interest rates by state and city that covered the whole of the United 
States on an annual basis from the time the National Banking system was established in 
1863. Like Breckenridge, Davis found substantial interregional differences in rates. 
Davis's data, moreover, permitted him to observe the long-term trend, which he believed 
showed the gradual convergence of regional rates. Why did these differences persist for 
so long? Davis (1965, 358) believed that there was a "disinclination of capital to 
migrate," that was gradually overcome. In part, this barrier was overcome by the 
diffusion of an important institution: the commercial paper market.
5 This market 
consisted of unregulated brokers, located mainly in financial centers, who would buy 
paper created by local businessmen and then sell it on a national market. Davis believed 
that rates came down and rate gaps closed as this network of brokers spread and provided 
competition for local banks.  
This hypothesis has been subjected to considerable criticism.
6 One of the first to 
criticize Davis's interpretation was George Stigler (1967). Stigler argued that it is not 
possible to make inferences of the sort Davis made about whether differentials between 
regions are "too" high in the absence of information about transactions costs. Suppose we 
observe that the price wheat is different in different markets, Stigler asks. Would we 





there were transaction costs that made it uneconomic to buy wheat in the cheap market 
and sell it in the dear market? 
Richard Sylla (1969) in another classic paper argued that Davis was right about 
persistent differences in interest rates, but wrong about the causes of the differences, and 
wrong about the reasons for their disappearance. Sylla argued that high rates in rural 
areas of the United States reflected local bank monopolies. The National Banking Act 
(1863 and 1864) in combination with a punitive tax on notes issued by state banks gave 
National Banks the sole right to issue bank notes. The Act also set a high minimum 
standard for the capital of national banks. Together these factors meant that many small 
towns, especially in the South and West became one-bank towns. These towns couldn't 
support a state bank because state banks couldn't issue notes, and they couldn't support 
more than one national bank because of the high minimum capital requirement. The 
result was a national bank that could exploit its monopoly position by raising interest 
rates on loans.  
This problem, as stressed by Ransom and Sutch (1977), was especially severe in 
the South after the Civil War. In the South poverty meant that the minimum capital 
requirement in the National Banking Act was an important barrier to entry, and illiteracy 
and innumeracy meant that the limitation on state banks of issue was also important. 
Over time, according to Sylla, the growth of deposit banking, partly as a result of the 
growth of numeracy and literacy, made it easier for state banks to compete, thus eroding 
the monopoly positions of the National Banks. The Gold Standard Act of 1900 reduced 





wake, which served both to further undermine the monopoly positions of local banks, and 
to illustrate it's underlying cause.  
John James (1976a, 1976b, 1978) reworked Davis’s interest rates and argued 
based on cross-state regressions that Sylla was right that local bank monopolies explained 
most of the differentials. Risk, in the form of loan loss rates, an issue raised by one of us 
(Rockoff 1977), could only explain a relatively small part. James differed from Sylla, 
however, on why local bank monopolies had been eroded. In James's view, the key 
development was the passage of "free banking laws" in various states that allowed small 
state chartered banks to enter local markets and compete with existing banks.  
The Sylla-James bank market structure interpretation was challenged by a number 
of writers. (1) Richard Keehn performed a cross-bank study for Wisconsin and found no 
evidence of local bank monopolies that would explain the local pattern of interest rates. 
Rates in Milwaukee (where there was lot's of competition) were sometimes higher than 
rates in rural areas. Wisconsin, however, as Keehn pointed out, may not have been typical 
because it had a long history of relatively free entry and competition. As far as we are 
aware, no one has tried to replicate Keehn's careful study for other states. This seems to 
us, however, to be the best way of getting at the one-bank-town argument. (2) The Sylla-
James hypothesis was also challenged by Marie Elizabeth Sushka and W. Brian Barrett 
(1984) who argued that financial market integration had occurred earlier than suggested 
by the Sylla-James hypothesis, and that increasing financial sophistication on the part of 
borrowers (reminiscent in some ways of Davis's position) explain the decline in rate 
differentials. And (3), the Sylla-James hypothesis was attacked by John Binder and David 





Gold Standard Act of 1900 as key developments. Instead they stressed the absence of 
branch banking and changes in agricultural returns.  
A number of writers have pushed in other directions. Kerry Odell (1989) explored 
the degree of integration on the Pacific Coast. Bodenhorn (1992) and Bodenhorn and 
Rockoff (1992) explored integration before the Civil War. Gene Smiley (1975) also 
modified Davis's interest rate estimates, and raised an interesting point about the 
measurement of interest rate differentials: should we look at absolute differentials or a 
measure of dispersion such as the coefficient of variation. Since interest rates were 
generally falling at the end of the nineteenth century (in the United States and the rest of 
the world) absolute differentials were falling. But dispersion measured, say, by the 
coefficient of variation was falling less rapidly. Smiley puts full integration, measured by 
low dispersion of rates, later than Davis. 
The implication of the regional differences identified by Davis and documented 
by subsequent writers for the efficiency of the short-term capital market as a transmission 
system for monetary policy depends on the reasons for the persistence of interest rate 
differentials. If Davis was right, then we would expect that monetary impulses that 
affected rates in eastern financial markets would have minimal effects on other regions. 
According to Davis it required a specific institutional link -- the commercial paper market 
-- to connect regional financial markets. It would seem to follow that when that link was 
lacking the transmission of monetary shocks would fail. On the other hand, if Sylla and 
James were right that local bank monopolies were raising the price of credit in rural 
areas, then there would be no presumption that the transmission mechanism would be 





higher than the price in competitive markets. We would still expect this station to raise 
and lower its price in response to changes in the wholesale price of gasoline.  
Even in Sylla-James case, one can think of reasons why interest rates in different 
regions might respond differently to monetary shocks. Conservative bankers in rural 
areas, protected by local monopolies, might be less inclined to keep abreast of and 
respond to every short-term fluctuation in the market. But on the whole, one would think 
that local bank monopolies, although they would imply a less than optimal allocation of 
banking resources, would not inhibit the transmission of monetary policy impulses. 
The possibility that regional differences reflected risks would also be consistent 
with the efficient transmission of monetary impulses. After all one sees persistent 
differences in rates of return on assets of varying levels of risk that trade in the same 
market. But they respond in harmony to monetary shocks. Lea Carty (1996) found a 
distinct regional premium on railroad bonds: Bonds issued by Southern railroads paid a 
higher rate. But Carty also noted that rates in the South and other regions fluctuated 
together in response to common macro-economic shocks.  
  To sum up, the literature on regional interest rates in the United States suggests 
that the ability of the short-term capital markets to serve as a conduit for monetary policy 
may have evolved rather slowly in the United States. Some stories are more encouraging 
to the advocates of monetary unions than others – for example the work by Sylla and 
James suggesting that local bank monopolies account for persistent rate differences or the 
work by Bodenhorn and Rockoff suggesting that a good deal of integration had been 
achieved before the Civil War – but all suggest that it took time and effort to achieve 





  This literature, however, has been largely silent on the second issue of crucial 
importance to students of monetary unions: where did shocks arise? Did interest rates 
vary throughout the country mostly because large shocks hit eastern financial centers? Or 
were peripheral regions subject to independent shocks? Our empirical work has been 
focused on this issue. 
 
3. Data and Definitions 
 
  The debate over regional interest rates in the United States, as we noted above, 
has generated significant amounts of data on bank lending rates by region. Banking 
across state lines was prohibited in the United States. Each state therefore had its own 
banking system. Many states, moreover, prohibited branch banking. The result was a 
myriad of local banks filing reports on their assets and earnings with government 
regulators. From this massive amount of data local lending rates of commercial banks can 
be established. If a few large banks with many branches had characterized the United 
States, as was the case in Canada and other developed countries, local rates might be 
much harder to establish. They would be recorded in the internal records of the banks, 
and would not be reported to regulators. As we will see below data for the most recent 
years may be contaminated by this problem. Luckily (for scholars if not for the country as 
a whole), the fragmented structure of the American banking system has created a 
substantial amount of data on regional interest rates.  
For regional interest rates we used Bodenhorn's (1995) estimates for the period 
1880 to 1960 and estimates based on data on the FDIC website for 1966 to the present. In 
the first decade after the Civil War, by the way, the Western United States remained on 





standard in 1879, so Bodenhorn's data starts when the U.S. monetary union is 
reconstituted after the Civil War. Bodenhorn (1995), following Smiley (1975) and James 
(December 1976, November 1976), purged Davis's data of various revenues and losses in 
order to arrive at something closer to contractual loan rates. Essentially, Davis attributed 
all bank earnings to loans, and divided that figure by total loans to get a proxy for the rate 
of interest. Smiley and James removed earnings on bonds and other non-loan earnings 
from the numerator and various non-loan assets from the denominator to produce a 
number closer to the contractual rate on loans. Bodenhorn (1995) extended these 
estimates to 1960. We also tried using Davis's original estimates because they are 
available before 1880 and for a finer division of regions. Some of our preliminary results 
are reported below. But these results suggested that the impurities may be important 
when it comes to using the rates in the VARs reported in the penultimate section of the 
paper.  
Our data for the period after 1966 was derived from income and balance sheet 
data posted on the FDIC website.
7 This data would appear to be exactly what is needed. 
The variable we used was the ratio of "Total Interest Income on Loans and Leases" to 
"Net Loans and Leases." The main problem here is that total interest income and loans 
are reported by bank and attributed to the home office of the bank. Interregional mergers 
in recent years have undoubtedly undermined the usefulness of the series as measures of 
regional interest rates. To bridge the gap between Bodenhorn's series and the FDIC loans 
and discounts series we interpolated using data from the Annual Report of the Federal 





Here a different variable, the ratio of "Interest and Discounts on Loans" to 
"Loans, Discounts, and Overdrafts" was available. This variable produced somewhat 
lower rates in the Northeast (especially in New York State), and so this variable was used 
as an interpolator. We simply computed percentage deviations from trend values in the 
FDIC loans, discounts, and overdrafts series and added them to deviations from the trend 
between the end of the Bodenhorn series and the beginning of the FDIC loans and 
discounts series. The standard deviations of the resulting series are relatively low during 
the period 1961 to 1965. But this is also true of other rates such as the corporate bond 
rate. So we did not try to adjust the interpolator for a potential difference in its underlying 
volatility. 
Figure 1, plots the bank lending rates in the Northeast and the West and the rate 
on high grade corporate bonds, a proxy for a rate that could be controlled through open 
market operations, for the period 1880 to 2002. An inspection of the chart tells the basic 
story. In the postwar era bank lending rates in the West and in the Northeast and the yield 
on high grade corporate are moving together. In the late nineteenth century this is far 
from obvious.  
How should we define "monetary policy?" First of all, it should be noted that the 
term "monetary policy" is anachronistic when applied to the nineteenth century. Before 
the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 the stock of money in the 
United States was determined primarily by (1) the amount of gold in the country, (2) the 
reserve ratios of banks, and (3) the currency deposit ratio of the public. Domestic mining 
and the balance of payments in turn determined the amount of gold. The Federal 





mistake to think of the Federal government as an active monetary authority. After the 
Federal Reserve was established in 1913 it makes sense to speak of monetary policy. 
What we are in fact doing for part of the period is examining the effects of monetary 
shocks on regional rates whether those shocks were caused by monetary policy or by the 
private sector. 
We experimented with several measures of monetary policy: (1) interest rates, 
including both short term rates and the corporate bond rate, which as figure 1 shows 
seems to be closely related to the bank lending rates, (2) the rate of change (or the change 
in the rate of change) of high-powered money, and (3) the rate of change (or the change 
in the rate of change) of the stock of money, generally M2. For the most part, however 
we report results using short-term interest rates in financial centers as the measure of 
monetary policy. This choice follows the current fashion of viewing interest rates as the 
measure of monetary policy. And focussing on interest rates is a good way of focusing on 
the efficiency of the transmission mechanism: when one end of the line was shaken, by 
whatever means, what happened at the other end? The monetary aggregates, moreover, 
seldom showed any clear effects on rates in the simple initial tests we used, partly 
perhaps because of the complicated structure of the effects of the aggregates on interest 
rates. Interest rates, of course, are only an intermediate indicator of the affects of 
monetary policy. Ultimately, we are interested in the affects on employment and prices. 
But we have not explored the connection between interest rate movements and regional 







4. Financial Crises 
  If monetary impulses were transmitted quickly through financial markets, and if 
interest rates were good indicators of monetary policy, then we would expect to find 
periods of extreme distress in financial markets recorded in interest rates from all regions. 
Financial crises are, to put it somewhat differently, natural experiments in which to test 
the integration of financial markets. Tables 2 and 3 use this idea by exploring several 
interest rates during the key periods of financial distress in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Although there were a number of financial crises, the crises of 1873, 
1893, 1907 and 1929 would surely be among those at the top of any list. Each was 
characterized by a stock market crash, a banking crisis, and a sharp downturn in 
economic activity. Depending on the variables one looks at, one might bring in a few 
other crises. Looking at the stock of money or deposits in suspended banks, for example, 
would point to the crisis of 1877-78. And looking at the change in the price level would 
point to the recessions that followed the Civil War and World War I. But few financial 
historians would disagree with the conclusion that the four crises examined here were 
among the most severe. Indeed, we would guess that most American financial historians 
would rate them as the four most important crises between the Civil War and World War 
II. 
In Tables 1 and 2 we show the cumulative change in particular interest rates from 
the level reached in the preceding trough of the business cycle (according to the NBER 
chronology.)
8  For example, the first entry in the first column of data in Table 1 shows 
that the commercial paper rate in 1871 was 27 basis points below the level in 1870 (the 





cyclical peaks such as 1873 are in bold – the commercial paper rate was 306 basis points 
above the level of the previous trough. As you can see, as least as far as Davis's data is 
concerned, the financial boom and bust cycle, shown so clearly in data columns one and 
two, was only imperfectly reflected in the regional rates. As might be expected, New 
York City rates conform fairly closely to the commercial paper and call money rates, but 
others show a much looser connection. Region III, mainly Southern states, follows its 
own path as it recovers from the Civil War. One might have expected a closer 
relationship in 1893, and 1907, but in Davis's data, which reports realized yields, the 
picture is also mixed in those years.  
Bodenhorn’s figures are the basis for the pictures of the crises of 1893, 1907, and 
1929 shown in Table 2. In all three crises we see the same pattern in money market rates. 
Commercial paper rates and call money rates rose dramatically during the boom 
(speculative bubble?) and then fell dramatically afterwards. In 1893 and 1929, although 
not in 1907, money market rates ended up below the level they had settled into during the 
previous trough. In 1893 regional rates followed a roughly similar path, although they did 
not fall so far below the level reached in the previous trough, as did money market rates. 
During the boom, rates in the Plains and in the West actually rose more than in the money 
markets. This was, by the way, the period of Populist agitation against the "moneyed 
interests." It is also, the only case in our data where increases in bank lending rates 
exceeded the increases in money market rates. This is the only case, to put the matter 







Perhaps the most surprising feature of Table 2 is the behavior of rates during the 
Great Contraction from 1929 to 1933. Most historians of the integration of U.S. financial 
markets have argued that the process was completed in the nineteenth century or at the 
latest early in the twentieth century. But here we see evidence of regions going their own 
way in the 1930s.  Most of the regional rates did rise along with the money market rates 
in 1928 and 1929. But the impact seems to have been somewhat muted. And while 
money market rates then plunged well below the 1927 trough during the years 1930-33, 
the regional rates remained above the 1927 level.  
This episode is so striking that it deserves a diagram. Figure 2 plots two money 
market rates, the commercial paper rate and the call money rate, and the four regional 
bank-lending rates from 1926 to 1934. It is hard to escape the feeling that the regional 
rates were divorced during this contraction from the violent fluctuations in the financial 
centers. It is possible that as the economy declined banks saw the risk attached to their 
average loan rising, so that risk adjusted rates may have been falling. But whatever the 
reason, it is clear that the typical bank borrower did not benefit from the rapid decline in 
rates in the financial centers. There were no major financial disturbances in the early 
postwar years, so it is not possible to find an example from that period to compare with 
the disturbances shown in Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 2. 
  A close look at the financial crises, to sum up, suggests that monetary shocks 
were communicated to all parts of the United States by financial markets, but that the 
level and timing of the responses was erratic. Focusing on the financial crises, of course, 





use more general statistics to characterize these response patterns. We begin with some 
simple correlations. 
 
5. Simple Correlations 
Perhaps the simplest way of approaching the question of short-run financial market 
integration is to ask whether regional interest rates tended to move in the same direction 
in the short run as interest rates in the financial centers (or other indicators of monetary 
policy) and whether the frequency with which regional rates moved in the same direction 
as rates in financial centers increased over time. Presumably, if financial markets were 
highly integrated interest rates in different regions would move in the same direction at 
the same time.  
This idea is applied in Table 3. Here we examined three periods: 1880-1905 (26 
years), 1906-1945 (40 years), and 1946-1960 (15 years). The years from 1880-1905 were 
a period of relative economic and financial stability. The United States was on the gold 
standard throughout and generally enjoyed peace and growing prosperity, although as we 
have seen there were periodic financial crises, particularly in the 1890s. During 1880-
1905 many scholars have argued, as we saw above, that US short-term capital markets 
although not fully integrated were heading toward that ideal. Scholars disagree, however, 
on when full integration was achieved. The years from 1906 to 1946 were a time of 
trouble when even highly integrated markets would behave in an anomalous fashion. This 
period includes two major financial crises, 1907 and 1929-33, and the two world wars. 
During the Second World War, moreover, market rates were distorted for a considerable 





institutional changes occurred that tended to further unify national capital markets 
including the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, and the concentration of the 
Federal Reserve’s authority in the Federal Reserve Board in Washington D.C. (Rockoff 
2000). The period after 1946 was, generally, one of economic stability with many of the 
prerequisites for financial market integration in place. 
For each sub-period we calculated the percentage of years in which the rate in a 
particular region moved in the same direction as the rate in the money markets. Panel A 
of Table 3 shows the percentage of years in which regional rates moved in the same 
direction as the commercial paper rate, Panel B shows the percentage of years in which 
regional rates moved in the same direction as the call money rate, Panel C shows the 
percentage years in which regional rates moved in the opposite direction (to capture a 
short-term liquidity effect) from the change in the rate of change (acceleration) of money, 
and Panel D shows these measures for various assets traded in the financial centers to 
provide a basis of comparison.  
If the markets were perfectly integrated in the short run, and if bank loans in 
various regions and short-term money market instruments were all of similar risk, we 
would expect that when rates rose in the money market they would rise in regional 
markets -- the figures in Table 3 would all be 100s. If the markets were completely 
separate we would expect that when rates rose in the money markets, they might rise in 
regional markets or they might, just as likely, fall -- the figures in Table 3 would all be 
50s.  
It is clear that by this measure the correspondence between movements of interest 





period. In the Northeast the percentage of same-direction movements was 72 
(significantly different from chance at the 10 percent level), but the percentage of same-
direction movements was lower in the other regions. In the South it was only 52 percent 
and in the West 44 percent, obviously no better than chance. Same-direction movements 
also seem to be a matter of chance during the disturbed years from 1906-1945. One could 
predict whether interest rates would move in the same direction or the opposite direction 
from the commercial paper rate by flipping a coin. Only when we get to the postwar era 
do we see a pattern that resembles what we would expect from a unified market. The 
pattern for the call money rate shown in Panel B is similar: we must wait until we get to 
the postwar period to see rates move up and down together.
10  
The positive correlations for the post war period, however, may be partly 
spurious. There was a sharp and widespread upward trend in interest rates after World 
War II. This trend may have been the result of rates returning to normalcy from the low 
levels of the 1930s. And the upward trend also may have been the result of a rising 
inflation premium. Naturally, if there were a broad upward trend in rates, year-to-year 
changes would turn out to be highly correlated. But while a return to interest-rate 
normalcy or an inflation premium in some sense may reflect common monetary factors, 
they do not represent the short-run monetary impulses that we are trying to uncover.  
Panel C. looks at a measure of monetary policy based on the stock of money 
(M2). Since the stock of money tended to rise from year to year for substantial periods of 
time, we looked at the change in the growth rate of the stock of money. In the short-run 
we would expect a decrease in liquidity to raise interest rates. So panel C shows the 





from a regional interest rate.  While there is generally a tendency for regional rates to 
move in the opposite direction to the change in the rate of change of money, the 
relationship is fragile. The problem may be that there are also positive connections 
between money and interest rates complicating the picture. Changes in the growth rate of 
money for example might signal expansion or inflation which generally produce higher 
rates.
11    
Panel D of Table 3 provides some evidence that our measure of integration, rates 
moving in the same direction, as crude as it is, can pick up signs of integration. Our two 
money market rates, the call rate and the commercial paper rate generally moved in the 
same direction during the initial period 1880-1905. During the second period, 1906-1945, 
however, there is retrogression, perhaps because the call money rate was being affected 
by disturbances and institutional changes in security markets.  
We find similar patterns if we look at securities that we know were trading in the same 
markets. For High-grade Municipal bonds and High-grade Corporates the percentages of 
same-direction movements, as shown in Panel D, are 84 percent in the first period, 73 
percent in the second period, and 93 percent in the third period, all statistically 
significant.  Interest rates on bonds of different quality ratings are available only for part 
of the period. Between 1920 and 1945 yields on Aaa (low risk) corporate bonds and Baa 
(medium risk) corporate bonds moved in the same direction 85 percent of the time, and 
from 1946 to 1960, 93 percent of the time. These comparisons show that our simple 
measure of co-movement is capable of picking up short-term integration when it is 
present. The high correlation of movements in the Aaa and Baa bonds did not mean, to 





averaged 3.76 percent while the Baa rate averaged 5.76 percent, a difference of 1.40 
percent. The difference gradually declined in the postwar period. But the decline was not 
a sign of increasing market integration, but rather increased economic stability, and hence 
a decrease in the risk attached to the Baa bonds 
As the problem with spurious correlation in the period 1946 to 1960 indicated, the 
simple correlations explored above, although suggestive, may provide a misleading 
picture of the correlation (or lack thereof) between monetary policy changes in financial 
markets and outlying regions. Vector Auto Regressions provide a way of characterizing 
the relationship that can avoid this and similar problems. 
 
6. Vector Autoregressions 
  Vector autoregressions (VARs) are a useful way of characterizing the data for the 
purpose of examining how amenable the system was to management by a single 
monetary authority. With VARs we can divide the changes in rates in each region into an 
amount that could be predicted on the basis of past values of all the rates in the system, 
and an error that depends on the shocks hitting the system. If most forecast errors were 
the result of shocks that arose in the financial core and diffused to the periphery then the 
task of the monetary authority would be straightforward. If an undesirable shock to 
national rates occurred then the authority could simply intervene in the core market and 
offset the shock. On the other hand, if most forecast errors on the periphery were the 
result of shocks that arose on the periphery itself, then the ability of a monetary authority 





  Our strategy was to set up a vector auto regression that included each of the 
regional rates explored above and a national rate, the latter being a potential or actual 
instrument of monetary policy. We then asked two questions of the resulting VARs. 
Were the markets integrated in all periods in the sense that shocks to the national rates 
were diffused to all regions? And were the national markets dominant in all periods in the 
sense that the movement of rates in the periphery mostly reflected movements in the 
core? 
  Our data, as noted above, extends from 1880 to 2002. We first divided this period 
into three segments: 1880-1913, 1914-1943, and 1955-2002. This division, we believe, 
would appear natural to most financial historians. The first segment extends from the start 
of our data in 1880 (the first year after the post-Civil-War reunification of the monetary 
union) to 1913 when the Federal Reserve was established. The second segment includes 
the disturbed middle decades of the twentieth century: the two world wars and the Great 
Depression. The last segment begins in 1955, when our data on the Federal Funds rate 
begins and represents the modern period in Federal Reserve history. One could, of 
course, break the initial period into different and additional segments. It would be 
interesting, for example, to break the initial segment near 1900 into two smaller segments 
because some financial historians have argued that full integration was achieved at about 
that time. Unfortunately, however, this additional break would leave us with relatively 
small samples given the model we wish to estimate. 
  In what follows we identify orthogonalized structural shocks in the VAR/VEC by 
assuming that the contemporaneous relationship matrix of the VAR is lower triangular. 





rate – the commercial paper rate or the Federal Funds rate, (2) the Northeast rate, (3) the 
Plains rate, (4) the Southern rate, and (5) the Western rate. This ordering was dictated 
partly by the main question: what could a monetary authority do? The monetary policy 
variable therefore comes first, and then the Northeast region. The Northeast contained the 
eastern financial centers: New York (by far the most important), Boston, and 
Philadelphia. The order to be chosen for the peripheral regions is less clear-cut. The order 
we usually worked with was, after the Northeast, the Plains states, the South, and the 
West. To some extent reflects a nineteenth century view of things. Today we would be 
more likely to put the West second and, perhaps, the Plains states last. 
  All the variables were tested for the presence of a unit root and it was found that 
all were I(1) in the sense that the hypothesis of a unit root could not be rejected.
12 Since 
all the variables were I(1) we needed to estimate the VAR in differences. This brings into 
play the issue of cointegration. If there is cointegration present the appropriate model to 
estimate is the Vector Error Correction model which is just the DVAR (VAR in 
differences) with error correction terms added to each equation. We used the method of 
Johansen (1988, 1992) to test for co-integration, but we used the sample size corrected 
critical values suggested by Cheung and Lai (1993).  
  Our results were mixed. (1) In 1880-1913 we found evidence at the 5% level of 
one cointegrating relationship between all the variables in the system. (2) In 1914-1943 
we did not find evidence of any cointegrating relationships. If one looks at a graph of the 
data for this period, for example Figure 2, it is obvious why this is the case. The 
commercial paper rate behaves quite differently from the regional rates. (3) In 1955-2002 





whether we combine the regional rates with the commercial paper rate or the Federal 
Funds rate. This result is strong if we allow for a break in drift in the variables in 1981. 
  Given these results we did the following: (1) For period 1880-1913 we estimated 
a VEC model with one lag, (2) for the period 1914-1943 we estimated a straight DVAR 
with one lag, and (3) for the period 1955-2002 we estimated two VEC models, one with 
the commercial paper rate as the “national’’ rate and a second with the Federal funds rate 
as the “national” rate. Our VARs are reported in Tables 5-7. 
   In each case we computed orthogonalized interest rate impulse response 
functions using a Cholesky decomposition. Given our ordering of the variables, the 
Cholesky decomposition means that we can interpret the shocks in the following way. 
The national shock is the shock that hits the commercial paper rate (or the Federal Funds 
rate). The Northeast shock is the component of the northeast residual that is orthogonal to 
the national shock. The Plains shock is the component of the plains shock orthogonal to 
both the national shock and the Northeast shock.  The South shock is the component of 
the South shock that is orthogonal to the National, Northeast, and Plains shocks. The 
West shock is the shock that hits the West that is orthogonal to all the other shocks. 
    These impulse response functions were then used to construct variance 
decompositions. The variance decompositions show the contribution each structural 
shock makes to the non-forecasteable components of each variable (i.e. the random 
component of each variable once we account for the trend, level, and the relationship to 
past levels of the series). We can display these decompositions on a simple graph.  The 
vertical axis measures the proportion (as a percent) of the variance of the forecast errors 





horizontal axis shows time in years. Variance decompositions are more useful for our 
purposes because they reflect both the size and frequency of the shocks as well as their 
impact as described by the VAR equations. The usual impulse-response charts does not 
show the size or the frequency of the shocks, but merely what the effect of a standardized 
shock would be. Since there are 5 variables in our system (the national rate and the four 
regional rates) there are 25 variance decompositions for each period.  
    We will focus first on the Northeast (the core) and the West (the periphery). 
Figure 3 shows the effect of a shock to the National rate on bank lending rates in the 
Northeast. As might be expected, in the most recent period shocks to the national rate, 
whether measured by the commercial paper rate or the Federal Funds rate, appears to 
explain most (about 70 percent) of the variance of the forecast errors in the Northeastern 
bank lending rate. Perhaps it is more surprising, however, that this also appears to have 
been true in the earliest period that we examine, 1880-1913. Only during the years of war 
and depression do we find a lower figure. If we move to the periphery (Figure 4) we find 
a very different story. As before, shocks to the National rate account for most of the 
variance of the forecast errors in the Western rate in the post World War II era. But if we 
go back to the period 1880-1913, or 1914-1943 we find that shocks to the National rate 
explain very little.  
    The other side of the coin is the role of shocks within the region itself. Figure 5 
shows the impact on the Northeast of shocks arising within the Northeast itself. In both 
the postwar and pre-1914 eras, shocks that we assign to the Northeast account for only 
about 20 percent of the variance of the forecast errors. Only during the war and interwar 





(Figure 6) we find something very different. Here we find that regional shocks were 
important – accounting for about 50 percent of the forecast errors in the West – during 
both 1880-1913 and 1914-1943. Only when we get to the modern era do we find that 
shocks arising independently in the West played a minor role.  
    If we look at the other peripheral regions, the Plains and the South, we see 
essentially the same pattern. Figure 7 shows the variance decomposition of the effects of 
shocks to the National rate on the Plains. Again, shocks to the National rate explain most 
(90 percent) of the forecast errors in the bank lending rate on the Plains during the 
postwar era, but a substantially smaller percentage during the two earlier periods. And 
Figure 8 shows the variance decomposition of the effects of shocks to the National rate 
on the South. And again, we find shocks to the National rate explaining 90 percent of the 
variance of the forecast errors in the Southern rate during the postwar era, but perhaps 
only 20 percent during 1914 to 1943, and only 10 percent during 1880-1913.
13   
    The simplest interpretation of these dramatic results, and the one that we favor, is 
simply that the regions have become more homogeneous over time. When Orange 
County California actually grew oranges the economy and hence bank lending rates 
behaved very differently from rates in other regions. Only a monetary policy tailored for 
California would have been able to offset local shocks. Now that the economy of Orange 
County is much like the economy in the rest of the country the relevant interest rate 
shocks are those hitting the national economy, and an interest rate policy tailored to 
California is no longer necessary.  One could, it is true, come up with some alternative 
interpretations. It could be true that the adoption of the Federal Funds rate as the 





the economy as a whole of shocks to this rate.  But this explanation does not explain so 
well why the commercial paper rate was dominant in the East in the late nineteenth 
century. 
     
7. Conclusion 
The U.S. monetary union was established at the end of the eighteenth century 
when the U.S. Constitution was adopted. But financial market integration did not occur 
overnight. Indeed, there is a long-running debate among financial historians over how 
quickly financial markets were integrated. The pessimists such as Davis maintain that it 
took nearly a century. The optimists, such as Bodenhorn and Rockoff, maintain that a 
high degree of integration was achieved in the antebellum period.  
But even if the optimists are right there was a second problem that made 
centralized monetary control problematic. In the nineteenth century, perhaps until World 
War II, the peripheral regions of the United States did not simply import interest rate 
shocks from other regions. They generated their own. In the first segment we examined, 
1880-1913, for example, most of the variance in the forecast errors we observe in the 
West were generated by innovations occurring in the West. This lack of synchronicity set 
a difficult problem for a potential monetary authority.  
It was true, to put it somewhat differently, that “When Wall Street Sneezed, Main 
Street Caught a Cold” If that is all there was to it, the money doctor’s task would be 
simple. Giving Wall Street a dose medicine whenever it sneezed would take care of Main 
Street as well. The problem was that Main Street often caught colds when Wall Street 





Was this problem peculiar to the American monetary union or is it to be expected 
in all such unions? Clearly, the unique institutional history of American banking has 
much to do with the resulting weakness of the banking system as a monetary transmission 
mechanism. Each state had its own independent banking system. As Breckenridge 
(1898), Davis (1965), and others have noted this system created artificial barriers to the 
movement of short-term funds. The Civil War, moreover, reversed much of the 
integration that had occurred in the first half of the nineteenth century by destroying the 
banking system of the South. And the National Banking Act adopted during the war put 
important constraints on the ability of the South to rebuild its banking system. As 
Bodenhorn and Rockoff (1992) and Bodenhorn (1992) have shown, there were important 
signs that capital markets were approaching full integration before the Civil War. This 
process will not of course be followed in detail in other monetary unions. Nevertheless, 
the possibility that political forces will prevent the unification of financial markets as 
existing monetary unions are extended or new ones created cannot be ruled out. 
Today the Federal Reserve relies on operations conducted in central financial 
markets.  This should not blind us to the possibility of other institutional arrangements. 
The system of Federal Reserve District banks was designed to deal with the unique 
problems of individual districts. It made sense to have an institutional structure that could 
respond to idiosyncratic shocks in rural areas. Bank reserve ratio changes, a largely 
forgotten tool of monetary policy, also could have been used as a tool for addressing 
problems in particular markets.  
The United States is often held up as an example of a successful monetary union. 





should be. The literature on regional differences in interest rates reviewed and extended 
here suggests that the journey from monetary union to optimal currency area was long 
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Table 1. Money Market Rates And Regional Interest Rates In Three Periods Of 
Financial Distress, 1873, 1893, and 1907. 
 
   
Change from the level in the preceding cyclical trough (basis points) 
 
Money Market Rates 
 






NYC  I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
   
                 
1871  -27  -27  -16  -59  27  -313  21  NA  NA 
1872  138  240  11  -67  -5  -403  28  NA  27 
1873  306  874  31  -43  6  -422  87  NA  119 
1874  -127  -218  -13  -106  -6  -441  28  NA  -112 
1875  -181  -254  -63  -178  -38  -536  48  NA  -40 
   
                 
1892  -128  -57  -92  -103  -18  -46  -33  -198  59 
1893  140  110  -54  -47  0  22  -71  -143  -15 
1894  -235  -237  -157  -121  -52  -145  -247  -261  -128 
                   
1905  20  221  -165  -64  -21  73  -33  183  21 
1906  148  462  -22  8  26  -54  1  11  -25 
1907  214  481  29  54  60  -43  -2  96  184 













Sources: Commercial Paper and Call Money: Friedman and Schwartz (1982, 122) 
Regional Rates: Davis (1965). These are Davis's "weighted returns of Reserve City 









Table 2. Money Market Rates And Regional Interest Rates In Three Periods Of Financial 
Distress, 1893, 1907, and 1929. 
   
Change from the level in the preceding cyclical trough (basis points) 
 
Money Market Rates  Bank Lending Rates  Crisis 
Commercial 
Paper 
Call money  Northeast  South  Plains  West 
             
1892  -128  -57  -78  -65  -55  -60 
1893  140  110  35  82  197  158 
1894  -235  -237  -82  -30  -9  -40 
             
1905  20  221  -69  -12  -20  -62 
1906  148  462  -32  -24  -40  -158 
1907  214  481  161  116  151  65 
1908  17  18  39  29  21  -130 
             
1928  82  195  -24  2  -55  159 
1929  176  361  82  34  39  24 
1930  -47  -109  44  61  78  135 
1931  -139  -229  21  34  37  119 
1932  -130  -201  61  36  64  129 
1933  -235  -290  46  7  51  137 
Sources: Commercial Paper and Call Money: Friedman and Schwartz (1982, 122) 

















1880-1905  1906-1945  1946-1960 
 























44  43  73* 
Money 
 
56  63  60 
 




64  50  87** 
South 
 
52  40  93** 
Plains 
 
44  40  93** 
West 
 
52  38  73* 
Money  40  43  60 
 




68  75*  67 
South 
 
72*  63  67 
Plains 
 





55  60 
Call Money 
 






D. Rates within the Financial Centers  
 
Commercial Paper 
and Call Money 




84**  73*  93** 
Aaa Corporate 










60  63  60 




36  43  60 
Notes: The Table shows the percentage of years in each period in which interest rates in a 
given region moved in the same direction as the commercial paper rate (panel A) or the 
call money rate (panel B), or in the opposite direction to the change in the rate of change 
of the stock of money, “acceleration” of money (panel C), or that rates in financial 
markets moved in the same direction (Panel D). One * means that the observation is 
significantly greater than 50 percent (chance) at the 10 percent level; two *s, that it is 































Maine  I  Virginia  III  Minnesota  IV  Arizona  VI 
New Hampshire  I  West Virginia  III  Iowa  IV  Idaho  VI 
Vermont  I  North Carolina  III  Missouri  IV  Utah  VI 
Massachusetts  I  South Carolina  III  Oklahoma  V  Nevada  VI 
Rhode Island  I  Georgia  III  Texas  III  California  VI 
Connecticut  I  Florida  III  Kansas  V  Oregon  VI 
New York  II  Alabama  III  Nebraska  V  Washington  VI 
New Jersey  II  Mississippi  III  North Dakota  V     
Delaware  II  Louisiana  III  New Mexico  V     
Pennsylvania  II  Tennessee  III  Montana  V     
Maryland  II  Kentucky  III  Wyoming  V     
Ohio  IV  Arkansas  III  Colorado  V     
Indiana  IV             
Illinois  IV             
Michigan  IV             
Wisconsin  IV             
Note: Region II includes the District of Columbia. Region NYC is New York City 










Table 5: Estimation Results for VEC:1880-1913 
 
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1         
comm
t r 1 -    1.000000         
           
NE
t r 1 -    1.317486         
   (1.04420)         
           
Plains
t r 1 -   -4.546399         
   (0.77771)         
           
South
t r 1 -    8.641425         
   (1.52986)         
           
West
t r 1 -   -1.614998         
   (0.53596)         
           
Constant  -26.05903         
VEC  comm
t r D  
NE
t r D  
Plains
t r D  
South
t r D  
West
t r D  
CointEq1  -0.035273  -0.056758   0.085985  -0.053066   0.063256 
   (0.09413)   (0.05326)   (0.08367)   (0.04887)   (0.12773) 
           
comm
t r 1 - D    0.098841   0.424982   0.301113   0.111647   0.163839 
   (0.21874)   (0.12376)   (0.19443)   (0.11357)   (0.29681) 
           
NE
t r 1 - D   -0.504462  -0.519332  -0.257823   0.209513  -0.277549 
   (0.43147)   (0.24411)   (0.38351)   (0.22401)   (0.58546) 
           
Plains
t r 1 - D   -0.811847  -0.447980  -0.569012  -0.361865  -0.156484 
   (0.40996)   (0.23194)   (0.36439)   (0.21284)   (0.55628) 
           
South
t r 1 - D    0.441062   0.368508  -0.293224  -0.285047  -0.133221 
   (0.60648)   (0.34312)   (0.53907)   (0.31487)   (0.82294) 
           
West
t r 1 - D   -0.076332  -0.123857   0.107312  -0.002879  -0.347544 
   (0.19838)   (0.11224)   (0.17633)   (0.10300)   (0.26919) 
           
Constant  -0.025112  -0.023869  -0.041686  -0.088148  -0.163564 
   (0.18027)   (0.10199)   (0.16023)   (0.09359)   (0.24461) 
 R-squared   0.479663   0.471995   0.352430   0.450357   0.263675 












t r D  
NE
t r D  
Plains
t r D  
South
t r D  
West
t r D  
comm
t r 1 - D   0.050360  0.333030  0.522799  0.210862  0.278810 
  (0.17724)  (0.12355)  (0.12562)  (0.11295)  (0.13995) 
           
NE
t r 1 - D   0.182246  -0.238599  0.027166  0.439248  -0.010536 
  (0.51221)  (0.35707)  (0.36304)  (0.32642)  (0.40446) 
           
Plains
t r 1 - D   -1.004283  -0.255433  -0.630108  -0.283657  0.353484 
  (0.36880)  (0.25710)  (0.26140)  (0.23503)  (0.29122) 
           
South
t r 1 - D   0.218811  0.254455  0.542377  -0.184302  0.019099 
  (0.50244)  (0.35026)  (0.35612)  (0.32019)  (0.39674) 
           
West
t r 1 - D   0.288042  0.179917  0.043915  0.043938  -0.703479 
  (0.24619)  (0.17162)  (0.17450)  (0.15689)  (0.19440) 
           
Constant  -0.235349  -0.145262  -0.160758  -0.146429  -0.114000 
  (0.15628)  (0.10895)  (0.11077)  (0.09960)  (0.12341) 
R-squared  0.341695  0.277109  0.536982  0.247354  0.505585 







Table 7a: Estimation Results for VEC:1955-2002 (using the commercial paper rate) 
 
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1         
comm
t r 1 -   1.000000         
           
NE
t r 1 -   7.541244         
  (1.14369)         
           
Plains
t r 1 -   23.06107         
  (4.02675)         
           
South
t r 1 -   -28.47610         
  (4.40977)         
           
West
t r 1 -   -3.785045         
  (1.30640)         
           
Constant  10.73664         
VEC 
comm
t r D  
NE
t r D  
Plains
t r D  
South
t r D  
West
t r D  
CointEq1  0.020828  -0.132273  -0.067825  -0.020118  -0.076725 
  (0.10335)  (0.06479)  (0.04639)  (0.04226)  (0.06009) 
           
comm
t r 1 - D   0.727232  0.399205  0.436929  0.399077  0.389193 
  (0.20474)  (0.12836)  (0.09190)  (0.08372)  (0.11904) 
           
NE
t r 1 - D   0.153596  0.407044  0.391188  0.171615  0.344568 
  (0.68746)  (0.43099)  (0.30856)  (0.28111)  (0.39969) 
           
Plains
t r 1 - D   1.415023  1.367305  0.987615  0.647794  0.908078 
  (1.62010)  (1.01570)  (0.72717)  (0.66247)  (0.94193) 
           
South
t r 1 - D   -2.983008  -1.426121  -1.243240  -0.866988  -0.874312 
  (1.60914)  (1.00883)  (0.72225)  (0.65799)  (0.93556) 
           
West
t r 1 - D   -0.453151  -0.487856  -0.431340  -0.258032  -0.618130 
  (0.74998)  (0.47019)  (0.33662)  (0.30667)  (0.43604) 
           
Constant  0.707789  -0.344920  -0.058878  0.142585  -0.114023 
  (0.57633)  (0.36132)  (0.25868)  (0.23566)  (0.33508) 
           
1981 D   -1.337117  0.842034  0.234775  -0.229040  0.319101 
  (1.12782)  (0.70707)  (0.50622)  (0.46117)  (0.65572) 
R-squared  0.415578  0.325975  0.520143  0.559034  0.358437 






Table 7b: Estimation Results for VEC:1955-2002 (using the Federal Funds rate) 
 
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1         
FedFunds
t r 1 -   1.000000         
           
NE
t r 1 -   10.23021         
  (1.69495)         
           
Plains
t r 1 -   31.98862         
  (5.91049)         
           
South
t r 1 -   -38.48361         
  (6.46709)         
           
West
t r 1 -   -5.689151         
  (1.93968)         
           
Constant  14.14103         
VEC  FedFunds
t r D  
NE
t r D  
Plains
t r D  
South
t r D  
West
t r D  
CointEq1  -0.043009  -0.106500  -0.063118  -0.026376  -0.069791 
  (0.09443)  (0.04929)  (0.03532)  (0.03288)  (0.04556) 
           
FedFunds
t r 1 - D   0.661498  0.327215  0.373366  0.332031  0.316519 
  (0.22216)  (0.11595)  (0.08308)  (0.07735)  (0.10719) 
           
NE
t r 1 - D   0.519498  0.476912  0.446614  0.222952  0.448527 
  (0.87070)  (0.45444)  (0.32561)  (0.30316)  (0.42010) 
           
Plains
t r 1 - D   2.399895  1.410201  1.051350  0.718209  0.986936 
  (2.01826)  (1.05338)  (0.75477)  (0.70271)  (0.97378) 
           
South
t r 1 - D   -3.629202  -1.314612  -1.159096  -0.784378  -0.785322 
  (1.98773)  (1.03745)  (0.74335)  (0.69208)  (0.95905) 
           
West
t r 1 - D   -1.082418  -0.662664  -0.578558  -0.388030  -0.818393 
  (0.96416)  (0.50322)  (0.36057)  (0.33570)  (0.46519) 
           
Constant  0.349886  -0.444830  -0.170794  0.059687  -0.200296 
  (0.76491)  (0.39923)  (0.28605)  (0.26632)  (0.36906) 
           
1981 D   -0.632014  0.988506  0.422644  -0.080521  0.482587 
  (1.44551)  (0.75445)  (0.54058)  (0.50329)  (0.69743) 
R-squared  0.354613  0.315409  0.509928  0.531116  0.350190 
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Figure 3. Variance Decomposition of Effect on Northeast Rate of a Shock to the National Rate 
 



































Figure 4: Variance Decomposition of the Effect on the West Rate of a Shock to the National Rate 
 





































Figure 5: Variance Decomposition of Effect on Northeast Rate of a Shock to Northeast Rate 
 









































Figure 6: Variance Decomposition of Effect on West Rate of a Shock to West Rate 
 







































Figure 7: Variance Decomposition of Effect on Plains Rate of a Shock to National Rate 
 






































Figure 8: Variance Decomposition of Effect on South Rate of a Shock to National Rate 
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regional interest rates with us. Deepa Bhat provided thoughtful research assistance. 
 
2.  We focus on short-term interest rates because it has become fashionable in recent years to 
think of these rates as the main instruments and indicators of monetary policy. We have done 
some experimentation with other measures of monetary policy, including long-term rates, 
money, and high-powered money. We do not believe that the use of alternative measures would 
substantially change our conclusions, but we have not carried out all of our work with alternative 
measures. 
 
3. Breckenridge also looked at regional differences in mortgage rates. Barry Eichengreen (1984, 
1987) and Kenneth Snowden (1987) explored these differences more recently.   Here, however, 
we have focused on the short-term rate differentials because these are more directly relevant to 
discussions of the effectiveness of monetary policy, at least as policy is currently discussed. 
 
4. Double-name paper was less risky than single name paper for the obvious reason that there 
were two people to sue if the debt was not repaid rather than one, and for the less obvious reason 
that it probably represented a "real bill." The purchaser of a real good (a carload of wheat) 
created a note, which was then endorsed by the seller, before being discounted by a lender. The 
original creator of the note then could probably repay it by reselling the wheat. 
 
5. The phrase was taken over from Breckinridge (1898, 129).  
 
6. Sylla (1977) provides a good summary of the literature from the first decade after Davis's 
seminal paper. 
  
7. John C. Driscoll of the Federal Reserve Board kindly shared the regional data that he used in 
his paper (2003) on bank lending rates. We derived our own series in order to be sure that they 
were as close as possible to being extensions of the earlier data. As it turned out, our final 
estimates were extremely close to Driscoll's.  
 
8. The chronology can be found at www.nber.org. 
 
9. We are stretching a point. Usually this adage seems to refer to a connection between stock 
market crashes and real economic activity.  
 
10. The results are similar if we look at changes over a 5-year interval. 
 
11. We also experimented with measures such as the simple rate of growth of money and the 







money also failed to uncover a measure of liquidity that was strongly correlated (in the simple 
sense used in this section) with regional interest rates.  
  
12. On economic grounds it seems unlikely that there would be a unit root in the interest rate 
series, especially in earlier years. Real rates would be anchored by the productivity of capital and 
time preference, and the inflation premium would be held in check by the gold standard. Perhaps 
in the postwar era when the inflation premium becomes an issue a unit root in nominal rates 
would be more likely.  
 
13. All the variance decompositions and the underlying data are available from the authors on 
request. 